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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Jun e

CONFLICT OF LAWS
FEDERAL VERSUS STATE LAw

The case of Harris v. Pennsylvania Railroad' is the latest example of the doctrine that in actions based on the Federal Employers' Liability Act,2 the substantive law as laid down by the federal
courts, and particularly by the Supreme Court of the United States,
is controlling.
DIVORCE:

JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

In Johnson v. Johnson 3 the court held that even though a married woman is a minor, she is capable of acquiring a domicile separate
from that of her husband for the purpose of divorce jurisdiction.
The court observed that the Ohio divorce laws do not contemplate
that a person will be discriminated against by reason of minority.4
It is well settled that a state cannot exercise through its courts
jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage when neither spouse is domiciled
within the state.5 Likewise, the word "residence" in a divorce statute
is generally interpreted to mean "domicile. ' 6 It is therefore a bit
unsettling to find the court in Jackman v. Jackman7 stating that the
word "resident" in Ohio Revised Code section 3105.03, relating to
jurisdiction for divorce, is not synonymous with "domiciliary." However, the decision actually turned on a pleading point, and the statement may fairly be called dictum.
The case of Davis v. Davis8 recognizes the validity of a Mexican
divorce where the plaintiff in that action was domiciled in Mexico at
the time of the divorce proceedings. The court bolstered its conclusion by pointing out that the present plaintiff, who was the defendant
in the Mexican action, had known about the decree, and about her
ex-husband's remarriage, for a period of about nineteen months before bringing the present action, and that avoidance of the Mexican
decree would affect the legitimacy of an unborn child.
1. 168 Ohio St. 582, 156 N.E.2d 822 (1959).
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1908).
3. 159 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio C.P. 1959). See also discussion in Domestic Relations section,
p. 372 infra.
4. The court also discussed the question of the defendant-husband's domicile in connection
with service by publication.
5. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 111 (1934), 113 (Supp. 1948).
6. Id. at § 9, comment e (1934).
7. 160 N.E.2d 387 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
8. 156 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio C.P. 1959). See also discussion in Domestic Relations section,
p. 372 infra.
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JURISDICTION TO DECREE ALIMONY OR SUPPORT

Except where there is property of the defendant before the court,
jurisdiction to decree alimony or support depends upon personal jurisdiction10 over the defendant." The principle is upheld in two recent
cases.
CUSTODY JURISDICTION

The question of jurisdiction to decree custody of minor children
is far from simple, and this Survey is not the proper place for an
extended treatment. It is enough to give the current Ohio cases, leaving to the interested reader the task of following through on the topic
as a whole.
In Davis v. Davis" the court held that the Mexican court lacked
jurisdiction to award custody, as neither the mother nor the children
were before the court. The court so held despite the fact that the
father was domiciled in Mexico. The court based its decision upon
May v..Anderson.1'
In contrast, but distinguishable, is Noble v. Noble,' 3 holding that
despite the absence of the father, the court had jurisdiction to grant
custody. In this case all the parties were domiciled in Ohio, and the
mother and children were present in Ohio, the husband's interest in
the family group having apparently waned, as evidenced by his failure to come home week-ends from his out-of-state labors. The court
referred to May v. Anderson 4 as being distinguishable. Whether
domicile or physical presence of the children was regarded as the
more significant factor was not determined.
PROCEDURE:

PRESUMPTIONS AND

INFERENCES

McDougall v. Glenn Cartage Company 5 reiterates the rule that
matters of evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are
governed by the law of the forum. The case dealt with an accident
in New York, and the question was whether, under the circumstances,
9. See RBSTATEMNT, CONFLIcT OF LAws § 116, especially comment d (1934).
10. Davis v. Davis, 156 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio C.P. 1959) (alimony); Noble v. Noble, 160
N.B.2d 426 (Ohio C.P. 1959) (support).
11. Supra note 10.
12. 345 U.S. 528 (1953). See Andrews, Conflict of Laws, Survey of Ohio Law - 1957,
9 W~sr. REs. L. REv. 270, 274 (1958); Andrews, Conflict of Laws, Survey of Ohio Law 1955, 7 WEsr. REs. L. REv. 250, 254 (1956); Andrews, Conflict of Laws, Survey of Ohio
Law - 1953, 5 WlsT. Ris. L. REv. 247, 249 (1954); Andrews, Conflict of Laws, Survey of
Ohio Law - 1952,4 WBsT. REs. L. REv. 210 (1953).
13. 160 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio C.P. 1959). See also discussion in Domestic Relations section,
p. 374 infra.
14. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
15. 169 Ohio St. 522, 160 N.E.2d 266 (1959). The decision of this case in the court of
appeals was noted in Andrews, Conflict of Laws, Survey of Ohio Law - 1958, 10 WEST.
RES. L. REv. 356, 359 (1959). See also discussion in Evidence section, p. 380 infra.

